In this paper, we take a statistical decision-theoretic viewpoint on social choice, putting a focus on the decision to be made on behalf of a system of agents. In our framework, we are given a statistical ranking model, a decision space, and a loss function defined on (parameter, decision) pairs, and formulate social choice mechanisms as decision rules that minimize expected loss. This suggests a general framework for the design and analysis of new social choice mechanisms. We compare Bayesian estimators, which minimize Bayesian expected loss, for the Mallows model and the Condorcet model respectively, and the Kemeny rule. We consider various normative properties, in addition to computational complexity and asymptotic behavior. In particular, we show that the Bayesian estimator for the Condorcet model satisfies some desired properties such as anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity, can be computed in polynomial time, and is asymptotically different from the other two rules when the data are generated from the Condorcet model for some ground truth parameter.
Introduction
Social choice studies the design and evaluation of voting rules (or rank aggregation rules). There have been two main perspectives: reach a compromise among subjective preferences of agents, or make an objectively correct decision. The former has been extensively studied in classical social choice in the context of political elections, while the latter is relatively less developed, even though it can be dated back to the Condorcet Jury Theorem in the 18th century [9] .
In many multi-agent and social choice scenarios the main consideration is to achieve the second objective, and make an objectively correct decision. Meanwhile, we also want to respect agents' preferences and opinions, and require the voting rule to satisfy well-established normative properties in social choice. For example, when a group of friends vote to choose a restaurant for dinner, perhaps the most important goal is to find an objectively good restaurant, but it is also important to use a good voting rule in the social choice sense. Even for applications with less societal context, e.g. using voting rules to aggregate rankings in meta-search engines [12] , recommender systems [15] , crowdsourcing [23] , semantic webs [27] , some social choice normative properties are still desired. For example, monotonicity may be desired, which requires that raising the position of an alternative in any vote does not hurt the alternative in the outcome of the voting rule. In addition, we require voting rules to be efficiently computable.
Such scenarios propose the following new challenge: How can we design new voting rules with good statistical properties as well as social choice normative properties?
To tackle this challenge, we develop a general framework that adopts statistical decision theory [3] . Our approach couples a statistical ranking model with an explicit decision space and loss function. Anonymity Given these, we can adopt Bayesian estimators as social choice mechanisms, which make decisions to minimize the expected loss w.r.t. the posterior distribution on the parameters (called the Bayesian risk). This provides a principled methodology for the design and analysis of new voting rules.
To show the viability of the framework, we focus on selecting multiple alternatives (the alternatives that can be thought of as being "tied" for the first place) under a natural extension of the 0-1 loss function for two models: let M 1 ϕ denote the Mallows model with fixed dispersion [22] , and let M 2 ϕ denote the Condorcet model proposed by Condorcet in the 18th century [9, 34] . In both models the dispersion parameter, denoted ϕ, is taken as a fixed parameter. The difference is that in the Mallows model the parameter space is composed of all linear orders over alternatives, while in the Condorcet model the parameter space is composed of all possibly cyclic rankings over alternatives (irreflexive, antisymmetric, and total binary relations). M 2 ϕ is a natural model that captures real-world scenarios where the ground truth may contain cycles, or agents' preferences are cyclic, but they have to report a linear order due to the protocol. More importantly, as we will show later, a Bayesian estimator on M 2 ϕ is superior from a computational viewpoint. Through this approach, we obtain two voting rules as Bayesian estimators and then evaluate them with respect to various normative properties, including anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, the majority criterion, the Condorcet criterion and consistency. Both rules satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity, but fail the majority criterion, Condorcet criterion, 1 and consistency. Admittedly, the two rules do not enjoy outstanding normative properties, but they are not bad either. We also investigate the computational complexity of the two rules. Strikingly, despite the similarity of the two models, the Bayesian estimator for M 2 ϕ can be computed in polynomial time, while computing the Bayesian estimator for M 1 ϕ is P NP || -hard, which means that it is at least NP-hard. Our results are summarized in Table 1 .
We also compare the asymptotic outcomes of the two rules with the Kemeny rule for winners, which is a natural extension of the maximum likelihood estimator of M 1 ϕ proposed by Fishburn [14] . It turns out that when n votes are generated under M 1 ϕ , all three rules select the same winner asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) as n → ∞. When the votes are generated according to M 2 ϕ , the rule for M 1 ϕ still selects the same winner as Kemeny a.a.s.; however, for some parameters, the winner selected by the rule for M 2 ϕ is different with non-negligible probability. These are confirmed by experiments on synthetic datasets.
Related work. Along the second perspective in social choice (to make an objectively correct decision), in addition to Condorcet's statistical approach to social choice [9, 34] , most previous work in economics, political science, and statistics focused on extending the theorem to heterogeneous, correlated, or strategic agents for two alternatives, see [25, 1] among many others. Recent work in computer science views agents' votes as i.i.d. samples from a statistical model, and computes the MLE to estimate the parameters that maximize the likelihood [10, 11, 33, 32, 2, 29, 7] . A limitation of these approaches is that they estimate the parameters of the model, but may not directly inform the right decision to make in the multi-agent context. The main approach has been to return the modal rank order implied by the estimated parameters, or the alternative with the highest, predicted marginal probability of being ranked in the top position.
There have also been some proposals to go beyond MLE in social choice. In fact, Young [34] proposed to select a winning alternative that is "most likely to be the best (i.e., top-ranked in the true ranking)" and provided formulas to compute it for three alternatives. This idea has been formalized and extended by Procaccia et al. [29] to choose a given number of alternatives with highest marginal probability under the Mallows model. More recently, independent to our work, Elkind and Shah [13] investigated a similar question for choosing multiple winners under the Condorcet model. We will see that these are special cases of our proposed framework in Example 2. Pivato [26] conducted a similar study to Conitzer and Sandholm [10] , examining voting rules that can be interpreted as expect-utility maximizers.
We are not aware of previous work that frames the problem of social choice from the viewpoint of statistical decision theory, which is our main conceptual contribution. Technically, the approach taken in this paper advocates a general paradigm of "design by statistics, evaluation by social choice and computer science". We are not aware of a previous work following this paradigm to design and evaluate new rules. Moreover, the normative properties for the two voting rules investigated in this paper are novel, even though these rules are not really novel. Our result on the computational complexity of the first rule strengthens the NP-hardness result by Procaccia et al. [29] , and the complexity for the second rule (Theorem 5) was independently discovered by Elkind and Shah [13] .
The statistical decision-theoretic framework is quite general, allowing considerations such as estimators that minimize the maximum expected loss, or the maximum expected regret [3] . In a different context, focused on uncertainty about the availability of alternatives, Lu and Boutilier [20] adopt a decision-theoretic view of the design of an optimal voting rule. Caragiannis et al. [8] studied the robustness of social choice mechanisms w.r.t. model uncertainty, and characterized a unique social choice mechanism that is consistent w.r.t. a large class of ranking models.
A number of recent papers in computational social choice take utilitarian and decision-theoretical approaches towards social choice [28, 6, 4, 5] . Most of them evaluate the joint decision w.r.t. agents' subjective preferences, for example the sum of agents' subjective utilities (i.e. the social welfare). We don't view this as fitting into the classical approach to statistical decision theory as formulated by Wald [30] . In our framework, the joint decision is evaluated objectively w.r.t. the ground truth in the statistical model. Several papers in machine learning developed algorithms to compute MLE or Bayesian estimators for popular ranking models [18, 19, 21] , but without considering the normative properties of the estimators.
Preliminaries
In social choice, we have a set of m alternatives C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } and a set of n agents. Let L(C) denote the set of all linear orders over C. For any alternative c, let L c (C) denote the set of linear orders over C where c is ranked at the top. Agent j uses a linear order V j ∈ L(C) to represent her preferences, called her vote. The collection of agents votes is called a profile, denoted by P = {V 1 , . . . , V n }. A (irresolute) voting rule r : L(C) n → (2 C \ ∅) selects a set of winners that are "tied" for the first place for every profile of n votes.
For any pair of linear orders V, W , let Kendall(V, W ) denote the Kendall-tau distance between V and W , that is, the number of different pairwise comparisons in V and W . The Kemeny rule (a.k.a. Kemeny-Young method) [17, 35] selects all linear orders with the minimum Kendall-tau distance from the preference profile P , that is, Kemeny(P ) = arg min W Kendall(P, W ). The most well-known variant of Kemeny to select winning alternatives, denoted by Kemeny C , is due to Fishburn [14] , who defined it as a voting rule that selects all alternatives that are ranked in the top position of some winning linear orders under the Kemeny rule. That is, Kemeny
Voting rules are often evaluated by the following normative properties. An irresolute rule r satisfies:
• anonymity, if r is insensitive to permutations over agents;
• neutrality, if r is insensitive to permutations over alternatives;
• monotonicity, if for any P , c ∈ r(P ), and any P that is obtained from P by only raising the positions of c in one or multiple votes, then c ∈ r(P );
• Condorcet criterion, if for any profile P where a Condorcet winner exists, it must be the unique winner. A Condorcet winner is the alternative that beats every other alternative in pair-wise elections.
• majority criterion, if for any profile P where an alternative c is ranked in the top positions for more than half of the votes, then r(P ) = {c}. If r satisfies Condorcet criterion then it also satisfies the majority criterion.
• consistency, if for any pair of profiles P 1 , P 2 with r(P 1 )∩r(P 2 ) = ∅, r(P 1 ∪P 2 ) = r(P 1 )∩r(P 2 ).
For any profile P , its weighted majority graph (WMG), denoted by WMG(P ), is a weighted directed graph whose vertices are C, and there is an edge between any pair of alternatives (a, b) with weight
A parametric model M = (Θ, S, Pr) is composed of three parts: a parameter space Θ, a sample space S composing of all datasets, and a set of probability distributions over S indexed by elements of Θ: for each θ ∈ Θ, the distribution indexed by θ is denoted by Pr(·|θ). 2 Given a parametric model M, a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is a function f MLE : S → Θ such that for any data P ∈ S, f MLE (P ) is a parameter that maximizes the likelihood of the data.
That is, f MLE (P ) ∈ arg max θ∈Θ Pr(P |θ).
In this paper we focus on parametric ranking models. Given C, a parametric ranking model M C = (Θ, Pr) is composed of a parameter space Θ and a distribution Pr(·|θ) over L(C) for each θ ∈ Θ, such that for any number of voters n, the sample space is S n = L(C) n , where each vote is generated i.i.d. from Pr(·|θ). Hence, for any profile P ∈ S n and any θ ∈ Θ, we have Pr(P |θ) = V ∈P Pr(V |θ). We omit the sample space because it is determined by C and n. Definition 1 In the Mallows model [22] , a parameter is composed of a linear order W ∈ L(C) and a dispersion parameter ϕ with 0 < ϕ < 1. For any profile P and θ = (W, ϕ),
Statistical decision theory [30, 3] studies scenarios where the decision maker must make a decision d ∈ D based on the data P generated from a parametric model, generally M = (Θ, S, Pr). The quality of the decision is evaluated by a loss function L : Θ×D → R, which takes the true parameter and the decision as inputs.
In this paper, we focus on the Bayesian principle of statistical decision theory to design social choice mechanisms as choice functions that minimize the Bayesian risk under a prior distribution over Θ. More precisely, the Bayesian risk, R B (P, d), is the expected loss of the decision d when the parameter is generated according to the posterior distribution given data P . That is, R B (P, d) = E θ|P L(θ, d). Given a parametric model M, a loss function L, and a prior distribution over Θ, a (deterministic) Bayesian estimator f B is a decision rule that makes a deterministic decision in D to minimize the Bayesian risk, that is, for any P ∈ S, f B (P ) ∈ arg min d R B (P, d). We focus on deterministic estimators in this work and leave randomized estimators for future research. Example 1 When Θ is discrete, an MLE of a parametric model M is a Bayesian estimator of the statistical decision problem (M, D = Θ, L 0-1 ) under the uniform prior distribution, where L 0-1 is the 0-1 loss function such that
In this sense, all previous MLE approaches in social choice can be viewed as the Bayesian estimators of a statistical decision-theoretic framework for social choice where D = Θ, a 0-1 loss function, and the uniform prior.
Our Framework
Our framework is quite general and flexible because we can choose any parametric ranking model, any decision space, any loss function, and any prior to use the Bayesian estimators social choice mechanisms. Common choices of both Θ and D are L(C), C, and (2 C \ ∅). In the rest of the paper, we focus on the following two parametric ranking models, where the dispersion is a fixed parameter. Definition 3 (Mallows model with fixed dispersion, and the Condorcet model) Let M 1 ϕ denote the Mallows model with fixed dispersion, where the parameter space is Θ = L(C) and given any W ∈ Θ, Pr(·|W ) is Pr(·|(W, ϕ)) in the Mallows model, where ϕ is fixed.
In the Condorcet model, M 2 ϕ , the parameter space is Θ = B(C). For any W ∈ Θ and any profile P , we have Pr
ϕ and M 2 ϕ degenerate to the Condorcet model for two alternatives [9] . The Kemeny rule that selects a linear order is an MLE of M 1 ϕ for any ϕ. We now formally define two statistical decision-theoretic frameworks associated with M 1 ϕ and M 2 ϕ , which are the focus of the rest of our paper. Definition 4 For Θ = L(C) or B(C), any θ ∈ Θ, and any c ∈ C, we define a loss function
We note that L top in the above definition takes a parameter and a decision in 2 C \ ∅ as inputs, which makes it different from the 0-1 loss function L 0-1 that takes a pair of parameters as inputs, as the one in Example 1. Hence, f 1 B and f 2 B are not the MLEs of their respective models, as was the case in Example 1. We focus on voting rules obtained by our framework with L top . Certainly our framework is not limited to this loss function. Example 2 Bayesian estimators f 1 B and f 2 B coincide with Young [34] 's idea of selecting the alternative that is "most likely to be the best (i.e., top-ranked in the true ranking)", under F 1 ϕ and F 2 ϕ respectively. This gives a theoretical justification of Young's idea and other followups under our framework. Specifically, f 1 B is similar to rule studied by Procaccia et al. [29] and f 2 B was independently studied by Elkind and Shah [13] .
The following lemma provides a convenient way to compute the likelihood in M 1 ϕ and M 2 ϕ from the WMG. Lemma 1 In M 1 ϕ (respectively, M 2 ϕ ), for any W ∈ L(C) (respectively, W ∈ B(C)) and any profile P ,
Normative Properties of Bayesian Estimators
In this section, we compare f 1 B , f 2 B , and the Kemeny rule (for alternatives) w.r.t. various normative properties. We will frequently use the following lemma, whose proof follows directly from Bayes' rule. We recall that L c (C) is the set of all linear orders where c is ranked in the top, and B c (C) is the set of binary relations in B(C) where c is ranked in the top. 
To prove that f 1 B satisfies monotonicity, it suffices to prove that for any profile P obtained from P by raising the position of c in one vote, c ∈ f 1 B (P ). We first prove the following lemma. Therefore, for any b = c, by Lemma 3, we have
, which proves that c ∈ f 1 B (P ) following Lemma 2. Majority and the Condorcet criterion. Let C = {c, b, c 3 , . . . , c m }. We construct a profile P * where c is ranked in the top positions for more than half of the votes, which means that c is the Condorcet winner, but c ∈ f 1 B (P ). For any k, let P * denote a profile composed of k + 1 copies of [c b c 3 · · · c m ] and k − 1 copies of [b c 3 · · · c m c]. It is not hard to verify that the WMG of P * is as in Figure 1 . 
Lemma 4
V ∈Lc (C) Pr(P * |V )
Proof: Let L −c = L − {c} and let P | −c denote the profile where c is removed from all rankings.
V ∈Lc(C)
In ( Since lim m→∞ lim k→∞ 1+ϕ 2k +···+ϕ 2k(m−2) 1+ϕ 2 +···+ϕ 2(m−2) · ϕ 2 = ϕ 2 1−ϕ 2 , for any ϕ < 1 √ 2 , we can choose m and k so that V ∈Lc (C) Pr(P |V ) W ∈L b (C) Pr(P |W ) < 1. By Lemma 4, c is the Condorcet winner in P * but it does not minimize the Bayesian risk under M 1 ϕ , which means that it is not a winner under f 1 B . Consistency. We construct an example to show that f 1 B does not satisfy consistency. In our construction m and n are even, and C = {c, b, c 3 , c 4 }. Let P 1 and P 2 denote profiles whose WMGs are as shown in Figure 2 , respectively. We provide the following lemma to compare the Bayesian risk of c and d. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.
For any 0 < ϕ < 1, 3(1+ϕ 4k ) 2(1+ϕ 2k +ϕ 4k ) > 1 for all k. It is not hard to verify that f 1 B (P 1 ) = f 1 B (P 2 ) = {c}. However, it is not hard to verify that f 1 B (P 1 ∪ P 2 ) = {c, b}, which means that f 1 B is not consistent. This completes the proof of the theorem. Theorem 2 For any ϕ, f 2 B satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity. It does not satisfy majority, the Condorcet criterion, or consistency.
Proof: Anonymity and neutrality are obvious. The proof for monotonicity is similar to the proof for f 1 B and uses the second part of Lemma 3. Majority and Condorcet criterion. We prove that f 2 B does not satisfy majority or the Condorcet criterion for the same profile P * as used in the proof of Theorem 1. By Theorem 5 in the next section, we have:
For any k ≥ 2, there exits m such that (2)< 1, which means that the Condorcet winner c is not in f 2 B (P * ). Consistency. We use the same profiles P 1 and P 2 as in the proof of Theorem 1 (see Figure 2 ). For P = P 1 or P 2 , we have:
For any k and m, we have that the value of (3) is strictly greater than 1. It is not hard to verify that f 2 B (P 1 ) = f 2 B (P 2 ) = {c} and f 2 B (P 1 ∪ P 2 ) = {c, d}, which means that f 2 B is not consistent. By Theorem 1 and 2, f 1 B and f 2 B do not satisfy as many desired normative properties as the Kemeny rule (for winners). On the other hand, they minimize Bayesian risk under F 1 ϕ and F 2 ϕ , respectively, for which Kemeny does neither. In addition, neither f 1 B nor f 2 B satisfy consistency, which means that they are not positional scoring rules.
Computational Complexity
We consider the following two types of decision problems. Definition 5 In the BETTER BAYESIAN DECISION problem for a statistical decision-theoretic framework (M C , D, L) under a prior distribution, we are given d 1 , d 2 ∈ D, and a profile P . We are asked whether R B (P, d 1 ) ≤ R B (P, d 2 ) .
We are also interested in checking whether a given alternative is the optimal decision. Definition 6 In the OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION problem for a statistical decision-theoretic framework (M C , D, L) under a prior distribution, we are given d ∈ D and a profile P . We are asked whether d minimizes the Bayesian risk R B (P, ·).
P NP
|| is the class of decision problems that can be computed by a P oracle machine with polynomial number of parallel calls to an NP oracle. A decision problem A is P NP || -hard, if for any P NP || problem B, there exists a polynomial-time many-one reduction from B to A. It is known that P NP || -hard problems are NP-hard. Theorem 3 For any ϕ, BETTER BAYESIAN DECISION and OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION for F 1 ϕ under uniform prior are P NP || -hard. Proof: The hardness of both problems is proved by a unified polynomial-time many-one reduction from the KEMENY WINNER problem, which was proved to be P NP || -complete by Hemaspaandra et al. [16] . In a KEMENY WINNER instance, we are given a profile and an alternative c, and we are asked if c is ranked in the top of at least one V ∈ L(C) that minimizes Kendall(P, V ).
For any alternative c, the Kemeny score of c under M 1 ϕ is the smallest distance between the profile P and any linear order where c is ranked in the top. We prove that when ϕ < 1 m! , the Bayesian risk of c is largely determined by the Kemeny score of c: We note that ϕ may be larger than 1 m! . In our reduction, we will duplicate the input profile so that effectively we are computing the problems for a small ϕ. Let t be any natural number such that ϕ t < 1 m! . For any KEMENY WINNER instance (P, c) for alternatives C , we add two more alternatives {a, b} and define a profile P whose WMG is as shown in Figure 3 using McGarvey's trick [24] . The WMG of P contains the WMG(P ) as a subgraph, where the weights are 6 times of the weights of WMG(P ); for all c ∈ C , the weight of a → c is 6; for all c ∈ C − {c}, the weight of b → c is 6; the weight of c → b is 4 and the weight of b → a is 2. Then, we let P * = tP , which is t copies of P . It follows that for any V ∈ L(C), Pr(P * |V, ϕ) = Pr(P |V, ϕ t ). By Lemma 6, if an alternative e has the strictly lowest Kemeny score for profile P , then it the unique alternative that minimizes the Bayesian risk for P and dispersion parameter ϕ t , which means that e minimizes the Bayesian risk for P * and dispersion parameter ϕ.
Let O denote the set of linear orders over C that minimizes the Kendall tau distance from P and let k denote this minimum distance. Choose an arbitrary V ∈ O. Let V = [b a V ]. It follows that Kendall(P , V ) = 4 + 6k. If there exists W ∈ O where c is ranked in the top position, then we let W = [a c b (V − {c})]. We have Kendall(P , W ) = 2 + 6k. If c is not a Kemeny winner in P , then for any W where b is not ranked in the top position, Kendall(P , W ) ≥ 6 + 6k. Therefore, a minimizes the Bayesian risk if and only if c is a Kemeny winner in P , and if c does not minimizes the Bayesian risk, then b does. Hence BETTER DECISION (checking if a is better than b) and OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION (checking if a is the optimal alternative) are P NP || -hard.
We note that the OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION for the framework in Theorem 3 is equivalent to checking whether a given alternative c is in f 1 B (P ). We do not know whether these problems are P NP || -complete. Theorem 4 For any rational number ϕ, 5 BETTER BAYESIAN DECISION and OPTIMAL BAYESIAN DECISION for F 2 ϕ under uniform prior are in P.
The theorem is a corollary of the following stronger theorem that provides a closed-form formula for Bayesian loss for F 2 ϕ . 6 We recall that for any profile P and any pair of alternatives c, b, w P (c, b) is the weight on c → b in the weighted majority graph of P . Proof: Given a profile P , for any c, b ∈ C, we let P (c b) denote the number of times c is preferred to b in P . For any c, b ∈ C, let K {c,b} = ϕ P (c b) + ϕ P (b c) . The theorem is equivalent to proving
. We first calculate Pr(P ).
For any c ∈ C, we have:
The comparisons of Kemeny, f 1 B , and f 2 B are summarized in Table 1 . According to the criteria we considered, none of the three outperforms the others. Kemeny does well in normative properties, but does not minimize Bayesian risk under either F 1 ϕ or F 2 ϕ , and is hard to compute. f 1 B minimizes the Bayesian risk under F 1 ϕ , but is hard to compute. We would like to highlight f 2 B , which minimizes the Bayesian risk under F 2 ϕ , and more importantly, can be computed in polynomial time despite the similarity between F 1 ϕ and F 2 ϕ . This makes f 2 B a practical voting rule that is also justified by Condorcet's model.
Asymptotic Comparisons
In this section, we ask the following question: as the number of voters, n → ∞, what is the probability that Kemeny, f 1 B , and f 2 B choose different winners? We show that when the data is generated from M 1 ϕ , all three methods are equal asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.), that is, they are equal with probability 1 as n → ∞. Theorem 6 Let P n denote a profile of n votes generated i.i.d. from M 1 ϕ given W ∈ L c (C). Then, Pr n→∞ (Kemeny(P n ) = f 1 B (P n ) = f 2 B (P n ) = c) = 1. Proof sketch: It is not hard to see that asymptotically almost surely, for any pair of alternatives a, b ∈ C, the number of times a b in P n is (1 + o(1))n Pr(a b|W ). As a corollary of a stronger theorem by [7] , as n → ∞, c is the Condorcet winner, which means that Pr n→∞ (Kemeny(P n ) = c) = 1.
We now prove a lemma that will be useful for To prove the theorem for f 1 B , it suffices to prove that for any b = c and any 0 < ϕ < 1, asymptotically almost surely, we have Hence, Pr n→∞ ( V ∈Lc(C) ϕ Kendall(Pn,V ) > V ∈L d (C) ϕ Kendall(Pn,V ) ) = 1. This proves the theorem for f 1 B .
We use Theorem 5 and Lemma 7 to prove the theorem for f 2 B . We note that ϕ Pn (b c)
1+ϕ 2Pn(c b)−n . By Lemma 7, Pr(c b|W ) > Pr(a b|W ), which means that asymptotically almost surely, we have the following steps of reasoning:
(1) P n (c b) > P n (a b) for all a, b. For any m ≥ 5, there exists W ∈ B(C) such that for any ϕ, there exists > 0 such that with probability at least , f 1 B (P n ) = f 2 B (P n ) and Kemeny(P n ) = f 2 B (P n ) as n → ∞ and votes in P n are generated i.i.d. from M 2 ϕ given W . For the second part, we sketch a proof for m = 5. Other cases can be proved similarly. Let W denote the binary relation as shown in Figure 4 . It can be verified that for all i ≤ 5, Pr(c i c i+1 |W ) (we let c 1 = c 6 ) are the same and are larger than 1/2, denoted by p 1 ; for all i ≤ 5, Pr(c i c i+2 |W ) are the same and are larger than 1/2, denoted by p 2 . We define a random variable X c b for any c W b such that for any n : c W b} converges in distribution to a multivariate normal distribution N (0, Σ), where Σ is the covariance matrix, and is non-singular by Lemma 9. We note that n j=1 X c b = P n (c b). Hence, with positive probability the following hold at the same time in WMG(P n ):
• For any other c i W c j not mentioned above,
If P n satisfies all above conditions, then by Theorem 5 f 2 B (P n ) = {c 1 }. Meanwhile, Kemeny(P n ) = f 1 B (P n ) = {c 2 } with [c 2 c 3 c 4 c 5 c 1 ] minimizing the total Kendall-tau distance. This shows that f 2 B (P n ) = Kemeny(P n ) with non-negligible probability as n → ∞, and completes the proof of the theorem. Theorem 6 suggests that, when n is large and the votes are generated from M 1 ϕ , all of f 1 B , f 2 B , and Kemeny will choose the alternative ranked in the top of the ground truth as the winner. Similar observations have been made for other voting rules by [7] . On the other hand, Theorem 7 tells us that when the votes are generated from M 2 ϕ , interestingly, for some ground truth parameter f 2 B is different from the other two with non-negligible probability, and as we will see in the next subsection, we are very confident that such probability is quite large (about 30% for given W shown in Figure 4 ). 
Experiments
By Theorem 6 and 7, Kemeny and f 1 B are asymptotically equal when the data are generated from M 1 ϕ or M 2 ϕ . Hence, we focus on the comparison between rule f 2 B and Kemeny using synthetic data generated from M 2 ϕ given the binary relation W illustrated in Figure 4 .
By Theorem 5, the exact computation of Bayesian risk involves computing ϕ Ω(n) , which is exponentially small for large n since ϕ < 1. Hence, we need a special data structure to handle the computation of f 2 B , because a straightforward implementation easily loses precision. In our experiments, we use the following approximation for f 2 B : Definition 7 For any c ∈ C and profile P , let s(c, P ) = b:w P (b,c)>0 w P (b, c). Let g be the voting rule such that for any profile P , g(P ) = arg min c s(c, P ).
In words, g selects the alternative c with the minimum total weight on the incoming edges in the WMG. By , which means that c minimizes b =c (1 + ϕ w P (c,b) ). In our experiments, b =c (1 + ϕ w P (c,b) ) is (1 + o(1))ϕ b:w P (b,c)>0 w P (b,c) for reasonably large n. Therefore, g is a good approximation of f 2 B with reasonably large n. Formally, this is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 8 For any W ∈ B(C) and any ϕ, f 2 B (P n ) = g(P n ) a.a.s. as n → ∞ and votes in P n are generated i.i.d. from M 2 ϕ given W .
In our experiments, data are generated by M 2 ϕ given W in Figure 4 for m = 5, n ∈ {100, 200, . . . , 2000}, and ϕ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. For each setting we generate 1500 profiles, and calculate the percentage for g and Kemeny to be different. The results are shown in Figuire 5. We observe that for ϕ = 0.1 and 0.5, the probability for g(P n ) = Kemeny(P n ) is about 30% for most n in our experiments; when ϕ = 0.9, the probability is about 10%. In light of Theorem 8, these results confirm Theorem 7. We have also conducted similar experiments for M 1 ϕ , and found that the g winner is the same as the Kemeny winner in all 10000 randomly generated profiles with m = 5, n = 100. This provides a sanity check for Theorem 6.
Conclusions
There are some immediate open questions for future work, including the characterization of the exact computational complexity of f 1 B , and the normative properties of g. More generally, it is interesting to study the design and analysis of new voting rules using the proposed statistical decision-theoretic framework under alternative probabilistic models, e.g. random utility models, other loss functions, e.g. a smoother loss function, and other sample spaces including partial orders of a fixed set of k alternatives. We also plan to design and evaluate randomized estimators, and estimators that minimizes the maximum expected loss or the maximum expected regret [3] .
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